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STANDARD GO¨DEL MODAL LOGICS ARE NOT REALIZED BY GO¨DEL
JUSTIFICATION LOGICS
NICHOLAS PISCHKE
Abstract. We show that the standard Go¨del modal logics, as initially introduced by Caicedo and Rodriguez in
[3, 4], are not realized by the basic Go¨del justification logics although being related by the forgetful projection.
1. Introduction
A central concept in classical justification logics is their relation to the classical (necessity-based) modal
logics. The heart of this relation is the so called realization theorem as already present in the earliest papers
(see e.g. [1, 2]) on the topic: given a modal theorem φ, the realization theorem provides a function r, mapping
φ to a justification formula φr, which assigns every occurrence of the modality  in φ some justification term
and this resulting φr is then again a theorem of the corresponding justification logic. Such a realization is called
normal, if negative occurrences of modalities are realized by justification variables and positive occurrences of
modalities are realized with polynomials in these variables.
In this paper, we investigate this property for fuzzy variants of modal and justification logics, namely standard
Go¨del modal logics as introduced by Caicedo and Rodriguez in [3, 4] and Go¨del justification logics as introduced
by Ghari in [8] and Pischke in [16]. These variants replace the classical boolean base of classical justification
logic with [0, 1]-valued Go¨del logics, one of the three main t-norm based fuzzy logics in the sense of Ha´jek [11],
and initially originating from an intuitionistic perspective along the lines of Go¨del [10], Dummett [6] and Horn
[12].
A first resulting difference is that, while in classical modal logic there is a natural notion of the dual operator
♦θ ≡ ¬¬θ, the natural dual of  in standard Go¨del modal logic is not internally definable any more. This
gives rise to three different fuzzy Go¨del modal logics, a bi-modal version containing both  and ♦ (see [5]) and
its respective  and ♦-fragments (see [3, 4]).
We only consider the -fragment in this paper as the justification modality “t :“, in its standard semantical
interpretation (both in classical and in Go¨del justification logic), is a necessity-style operator. As there is no
immediate dual notion of “t :“, neither in classical nor in Go¨del justification logic, there is also no immediate
way of interpreting ♦ in the fuzzy justification setting.
Syntactically, we define a set of justification terms Jt as
Jt : t ::= c | x | [t+ t] | [t · t] | !t | ?t
where c ∈ C := {ci | i ∈ N} is a justification constant and x ∈ V := {xi | i ∈ N} is a justification variable. The
corresponding language of justification logics LJ is then given as
LJ : φ ::= ⊥ | p | (φ→ φ) | (φ ∧ φ) | t : φ
with t ∈ Jt and p ∈ V ar := {pi | i ∈ N} a propositional variable. ¬ is introduced as a syntactical abbreviation
by ¬φ := (φ→ ⊥).
The fundamental semantics of Go¨del justification logics used here is the many-valued analogue of the classical
Mkrtychev models [15], called Go¨del-Mkrtychev models. These extend the standard minimum t-norm based
semantics for propositional Go¨del logics as follows, where we denote the minimum t-norm by ⊙ and by ⊕ the
maximum function, i.e. x ⊙ y = min{x, y} and x ⊕ y = max{x, y}. Precisely, a Go¨del-Mkrtychev model is a
structure M = 〈E , e〉 where
(1) E : Jt× LJ → [0, 1],
(2) e : V ar → [0, 1],
and which satisfies
(i) E(t, φ→ ψ)⊙ E(s, φ) ≤ E(t · s, ψ) for all t, s ∈ Jt, φ, ψ ∈ LJ ,
(ii) E(t, φ) ⊕ E(s, φ) ≤ E(t+ s, φ) for all t, s ∈ Jt, φ ∈ LJ .
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We denote the class of all Go¨del-Mkrtychev models by GM. We call a GM-model M = 〈E , e〉 crisp if both E
and e only take values in {0, 1}.
For a GM-model M = 〈E , e〉, we define its evaluation function | · |M : LJ → [0, 1] as follows:
• |⊥|M = 0,
• |p|M = e(p) for p ∈ V ar,
• |φ→ ψ|M = |φ|M ⇒ |ψ|M,
• |φ ∧ ψ|M = |φ|M ⊙ |ψ|M,
• |t : φ|M = E(t, φ),
where we write ⇒ for the residuum (see e.g. [11]) of ⊙, i.e.
x⇒ y =
{
y if x > y
1 otherwise
for x, y ∈ [0, 1]. For the derived connective ¬, we obtain the following derived truth function ∼:
∼ x =
{
0 if x > 0
1 otherwise
and for ∼∼ x, we also write ∼2 x.
We may extend the evaluation to sets of formulas Γ ⊆ LJ by setting |Γ|M = infφ∈Γ{|φ|M}. We write M |= φ
if |φ|M = 1 and M |= Γ if M |= φ for any φ ∈ Γ.
A GM-model M = 〈E , e〉 is called a
(1) GMT-model if E(t, φ) ≤ |φ|M for all t ∈ Jt, φ ∈ LJ ,
(2) GM4-model if E(t, φ) ≤ E(!t, t : φ) for all t ∈ Jt, φ ∈ LJ ,
(3) GMLP-model if (1) and (2),
(4) GM45-model if (2) and ∼ E(t, φ) ≤ E(?t,¬t : φ) for all t ∈ Jt, φ ∈ LJ ,
(5) GMT45-model if (1) and (4).
Definition 1. Let C be class of GM-models. For Γ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ , we say that Γ 1-entails φ in C, written Γ |=C φ,
if for any model M ∈ C, if M |= Γ, then M |= φ.
The other standard semantics for classical justification logics defined by so called Fitting-models, see [7], also
extends to the fuzzy cases, see e.g. [8, 9, 16].
We define the following proof systems for Go¨del justification logic over LJ based on Ha´jek’s strongly complete
Hilbert-style proof calculus for propositional Go¨del logic given in [11]:
Definition 2. The Hilbert-style calculus GJ 0 is given by the following axiom schemes and rules over LJ :
(A1): (φ→ ψ)→ ((ψ → χ)→ (φ→ χ))
(A2): (φ ∧ ψ)→ φ
(A3): (φ ∧ ψ)→ (ψ ∧ φ)
(A5a): (φ→ (ψ → χ))→ ((φ ∧ ψ)→ χ)
(A5b): ((φ ∧ ψ)→ χ)→ (φ→ (ψ → χ))
(A6): ((φ→ ψ)→ χ)→ (((ψ → φ)→ χ)→ χ)
(A7): ⊥ → φ
(G4): φ→ (φ ∧ φ)
(J): t : (φ→ ψ)→ (s : φ→ [t · s] : ψ)
(+): t : φ→ [t+ s] : φ, s : φ→ [t+ s] : φ
(MP ): From φ→ ψ and φ, infer ψ.
By G, we denote the fragment without the axiom schemes (J) and (+). We then define the following axiomatic
extensions of GJ 0:
(1) GJ T 0 is the extension of GJ 0 by the scheme (F ) : t : φ→ φ,
(2) GJ 40 is the extension of GJ 0 by the scheme (!) : t : φ→!t : t : φ,
(3) GLP0 is the extension of GJ T 0 by the scheme (!),
(4) GJ 450 is the extension of GJ 40 by the scheme (?) : ¬t : φ→?t : ¬t : φ,
(5) GJ T 450 is the extension of GJ 450 by the scheme (F ).
Provability (possibly with assumptions) in such a Hilbert-style calculus S is defined as usual and denoted by
the relation symbol ⊢S .
STANDARD GO¨DEL MODAL LOGICS ARE NOT REALIZED BY GO¨DEL JUSTIFICATION LOGICS 3
Let GJL0 be one the previously introduced Go¨del justification logics. We call a set CS of formulas of the
form
cin : · · · : ci1 : φ, n ≥ 1,
where φ is an axiom instance of GJL0, cik ∈ C and such that
if cin : · · · : ci1 : φ ∈ CS, then cik : · · · : ci1 : φ for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n},
a constant specification for GJL0. A constant specification CS for GJL0 is called axiomatically appropriate if
for every axiom instance φ of GJL0, there is a constant c ∈ C such that c : φ ∈ CS and
if cin : · · · : ci1 : φ, then cin+1 : cin : · · · : ci1 : φ for some constant cin+1 .
A constant specification CS for GJL0 is called total if
cin : · · · : ci1 : φ ∈ CS for every n ≥ 1, i1, . . . , in ∈ N and every axiom instace φ.
Given a constant specification CS for GJL0, we define the logic GJLCS as the extension of GJL0 by the rule
(CS):
From c : φ ∈ CS, infer c : φ.
We say that a Go¨del-Mkrtychev model M = 〈E , e〉 respects a constant specification CS if E(c, φ) = 1 for every
c : φ ∈ CS. Given a class of Go¨del-Mkrtychev models C, we denote the subclass of all models respecting CS by
CCS. A first important result on the Go¨del-based systems is the lifting lemma as an analogue to the classical
case.
Lemma 1 (Lifting lemma, P. [16]). Let
GJL0 ∈ {GJ 0,GJ T 0,GJ 40,GLP0,GJ 450,GJ T 450}
and CS be an axiomatically appropriate constant specification for GJL0. If
{ψ1, . . . , ψn} ⊢GJLCS φ, then for any justification terms t1, . . . , tn ∈ Jt, there is a justification term t ∈ Jt such
that
{t1 : ψ1, . . . , tn : ψn} ⊢GJLCS t : φ.
A direct consequence of the lifting lemma is the internalization property for certain justification logics.
Corollary 1 (Internalization). Let
GJL0 ∈ {GJ 0,GJ T 0,GJ 40,GLP0,GJ 450,GJ T 450}
and CS be an axiomatically appropriate constant specification for GJL0. Then if ⊢GJCS φ, then there is a
t ∈ Jt such that ⊢GJCS t : φ.
The main theorem on Go¨del justification logics used in this paper is the completeness theorem for the above
systems and the Go¨del-Mkrtychev models introduced before.
Theorem 2 (Completeness, P. [16]). Let
GJL0 ∈ {GJ 0,GJ T 0,GJ 40,GLP0,GJ 450,GJ T 450}
and CS be a constant specification for GJL0. Let
GMJL ∈ {GM,GMT,GM4,GMLP,GM45,GMT45}
be the corresponding class of Go¨del-Mkrtychev models for GJL0. Then for all Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ :
Γ ⊢GJLCS φ iff Γ |=GMJLCS φ.
On the modal side, we fix a necessity-based modal language L by
L : φ ::= ⊥ | p | (φ ∧ φ) | (φ→ φ) | φ
Before we concern ourselves with the concept of realizability, we present the standard Hilbert-style proof theo-
retic access to standard Go¨del modal logics based on the work of Caicedo and Rodriguez in [3, 4]. We define
the following Hilbert-style proof calculi in the language L:
Definition 3. GK is given by the following axiom schemes and rules:
(G): The axiom schemes of the calculus G.
(K): (φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ ψ)
(Z): ¬¬φ→ ¬¬φ
(MP ): From φ→ ψ and φ, infer ψ.
(N): From ⊢ φ, infer ⊢ φ.
We then define the following axiomatic extensions of GK:
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(1) GT  is the extension of GK by the axiom scheme (T ) : φ→ φ,
(2) GK4 is the extension of GK by the axiom scheme (4) : φ→ φ,
(3) GS4 is the extension of GT  by the axiom scheme (4).
The notation of the rule (N) is used to indicate that it may only be applied to pure theorems of the
respective calculus if it is a proof with a set of assumptions.
In [4], Caicedo and Rodriguez obtained completeness theorems for these logics together with a natural
semantics defined over model classes of [0, 1]-valued Kripke models, called Go¨del-Kripke models.
Justification logics are often presented relative to a given constant specification. It shall be noted that by the
modal inference rule (N) in all of the above systems, for every theorem θ, θ is a theorem as well. Thus, any
candidate Go¨del justification logic for realization of a corresponding standard Go¨del modal logic has to have
the internalization property.
In the following, for a given proof system S over a language L, we write ThS = {φ ∈ L | ⊢S φ}.
1.1. Forgetful projection. A natural projection from the explicit modal language LJ to L is the one mapping
every explicit modality “t :“ to the unexplicit modality , called the forgetful projection. We define the forgetful
projection operator ◦ : LJ → L formally by recursion on the structure of LJ as follows:
• p 7→ p for p ∈ V ar,
• ⊥ 7→ ⊥, ⊤ 7→ ⊤,
• φ ∧ ψ 7→ φ◦ ∧ ψ◦,
• φ→ ψ 7→ φ◦ → ψ◦,
• t : φ 7→ φ◦
We may extend ◦ to sets of formulas Γ ⊆ LJ via Γ
◦ := {φ◦ | φ ∈ Γ}.
Remark 2. For the various axioms of Go¨del justification logics, we obtain the following forgetful projections:
(1) (t : (φ→ ψ)→ (s : φ→ [t · s] : ψ))◦ = (φ◦ → ψ◦)→ (φ◦ → ψ◦),
(2) (t : φ→ [t+ s] : φ)◦ = φ◦ → φ◦, (s : φ→ [t+ s] : φ)◦ = φ◦ → φ◦,
(3) (t : φ→ φ)◦ = φ◦ → φ◦,
(4) (t : φ→!t : t : φ)◦ = φ◦ → φ◦,
Note, that the cases in (2) are instances of a propositional tautology, while (1),(3),(4) and (5) are instances
of the various axioms of standard Go¨del modal logic, all in the language of L.
Theorem 3. Let GJL0 ∈ {GJ 0,GJ T 0,GJ 40,GLP0}, CS be a constant specification for GJL0 and GML ∈
{GK,GT ,GK4,GS4} be the corresponding Go¨del modal logic. Then, for all Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ : Γ ⊢GJLCS φ
implies Γ◦ ⊢GML φ
◦.
The proof of the theorem is a straightforward induction on the length of the proof.
2. Realization fails without factivity
In the following, we concern ourselves with the non-realizability of the axiom scheme (Z). We approach this
using a countermodel construction, where we for now require that the justification logics do not contain the
factivity axiom scheme (F ).
For this, let TCS be the total constant specification for GJ 450, and x ∈ (0, 1). We define the x-rooted
provability model Mx = 〈Ex, ex〉 by ex(p) = x for any p ∈ V ar and
Ex(t, φ) =
{
1 if ⊢GJ 45TCS φ and ⊢GJ 45TCS t : φ
x else
for any t ∈ Jt, φ ∈ LJ . It is easy to see that for φ ∈ LJ , we have |φ|Mx ∈ {0, x, 1}. We then first obtain the
following:
Lemma 4. For any x ∈ (0, 1), Mx is a GM45TCS-model.
Proof. We verify the conditions:
(1) We have ⊢GJ 45TCS c : φ for any c : φ ∈ TCS. By definition, either φ is an axiom instance or
φ = d : ψ ∈ TCS by downward closure. Either way ⊢GJ 45TCS φ and thus we have Ex(c, φ) = 1 for any
such c : φ, i.e. Mx respects TCS.
(2) Let φ ∈ LJ and t, s ∈ Jt. If Ex(t, φ) ⊕ Ex(s, φ) = x, then the claim is immediate. Thus suppose
Ex(t, φ) ⊕ Ex(s, φ) = 1, i.e. per definition Ex(t, φ) = 1 or Ex(s, φ) = 1. In either case ⊢GJ 45TCS φ and
additionally ⊢GJ 45TCS t : φ or ⊢GJ 45TCS s : φ. Either way, by the axiom scheme (+) and the rule (MP ),
we have ⊢GJ 45TCS [t+ s] : φ, i.e. Ex(t+ s, φ) = 1.
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(3) Let φ, ψ ∈ LJ and t, s ∈ Jt. If Ex(t, φ → ψ) ⊙ Ex(s, φ) = x, then the claim is immediate. Thus
suppose Ex(t, φ → ψ) ⊙ Ex(s, φ) = 1, i.e. Ex(t, φ → ψ), Ex(s, φ) = 1 and thus ⊢GJ 45TCS φ → ψ,
⊢GJ 45TCS t : (φ→ ψ) as well as ⊢GJ 45TCS φ and ⊢GJ 45TCS s : φ. By (MP ) and the axiom scheme (J),
we have ⊢GJ 45TCS ψ and ⊢GJ 45TCS [t · s] : ψ, i.e. Ex(t · s, ψ) = 1.
(4) Let φ ∈ LJ and t ∈ Jt. If Ex(t, φ) = x, then we have immediately that Ex(t, φ) ≤ Ex(!t, t : φ). Thus,
suppose Ex(t, φ) = 1, then ⊢GJ 45TCS φ and ⊢GJ 45TCS t : φ. The latter implies ⊢GJ 45TCS !t : t : φ by the
axiom scheme (!) and (MP ), i.e. Ex(!t, t : φ) = 1.
(5) We always have Ex(t, φ) ∈ {x, 1}, i.e. as x > 0 we always have ∼ Ex(t, φ) = 0 and thus, for any φ ∈ LJ
and t ∈ Jt, we have ∼ Ex(t, φ) ≤ Ex(?t,¬t : φ).

Mx now serves as a counter model for realization instances of the modal axiom (Z).
Lemma 5. For any φ ∈ LJ such that 6⊢GJ 45TCS ¬¬φ and any t, s ∈ Jt:
6⊢GJ 45TCS ¬¬t : φ→ s : ¬¬φ.
Proof. Suppose 6⊢GJ 45CS ¬¬φ for φ ∈ LJ and let t, s ∈ Jt as well as x ∈ (0, 1). As
⊢GJ 45TCS φ→ ¬¬φ,
we have 6⊢GJ 45TCS φ as otherwise ⊢GJ 45TCS ¬¬φ by (MP ). Thus, |t : φ|Mx = Ex(t, φ) = x ∈ (0, 1).
As Ex(t, φ) > 0, we have |¬¬t : φ|Mx = 1 by the semantical evaluation of ¬ by ∼. However, we have
|s : ¬¬φ|Mx = Ex(s,¬¬φ) = x < 1
as 6⊢GJ 45TCS ¬¬φ. Thus, we have
|¬¬t : φ→ s : ¬¬φ|Mx = x < 1
and by Lem. 4 Mx is a GM45TCS-model. Per definition, we have
6|=GM45TCS ¬¬t : φ→ s : ¬¬φ,
that is by Thm. 2:
6⊢GJ 45TCS ¬¬t : φ→ s : ¬¬φ.

By this lemma, for any formula for which its double-negation projection is not provable (or valid), there is
no valid (realized) formula structured like the (Z)-axiom. As for e.g. any propositional variable p, its double
negation is never provable, we have the following two theorems.
Theorem 6. For any constant specification CS for GJ 0: (ThGJCS )
◦ ( ThGK .
Proof. (ThGJCS )
◦ ⊆ ThGK follows from Thm. 3. By the modal axiom (Z), ⊢GK ¬¬p→ ¬¬p for p ∈ V ar,
but as 6⊢GJ 45TCS ¬¬p, for any t, s ∈ Jt:
6⊢GJ 45TCS ¬¬t : p→ s : ¬¬p,
by Lem. 5. Thus, by CS ⊆ TCS as all GJ 0 axiom schemes are also GJ 450 axiom schemes, we have
6⊢GJCS ¬¬t : p→ s : ¬¬p
for any t, s ∈ Jt as if there would be a proof, this proof could be also carried out in GJ 45TCS. Thus, there is
no φ ∈ LJ such that ⊢GJCS φ, i.e. φ ∈ ThGJCS , and such that φ
◦ = ¬¬p→ ¬¬p. 
By a similar proof, we have the following.
Theorem 7. For any constant specification CS for GJ 40: (ThGJ 4CS )
◦ ( ThGK4 .
In fact, GJ 4CS does not even realize GK, as the problem remains with axiom (Z). However, of course
the forgetful projection of the introspection axiom scheme t : φ →!t : t : φ is not a theorem of GK, i.e.
(ThGJ 4CS )
◦ 6⊆ ThGK .
It also important to note that it is crucial for the proof of Thm. 5 that Go¨del-Mkrtychev models are many-
valued as x ∈ (0, 1) is necessary. Making Mx crisp by moving x to 1 makes any instance of ¬¬t : φ→ s : ¬¬φ
valid in Mx and moving x to 0 makes at least some instance of ¬¬t : φ→ s : ¬¬φ valid in Mx for any φ:
As we have that ⊢GJ 45TCS φ → ¬¬φ, by internalization (Corr. 1, as TCS is axiomatically appropriate) it
follows, that we have ⊢GJ 45TCS r : (φ → ¬¬φ) for some r ∈ Jt. Thus by (J) and modus ponens, we have
⊢GJ 45TCS t : φ→ [r · t] : ¬¬φ for any t ∈ Jt. Thus, we have:
• If E0(t, φ) = 0, then ∼
2 E0(t, φ) = 0 and there is nothing to show.
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• If E0(t, φ) = 1, then ∼
2 E0(t, φ) = 1 and by definition ⊢GJ 45TCS φ and ⊢GJ 45TCS t : φ. Then, with
⊢GJ 45TCS t : φ → [r · t] : ¬¬φ and ⊢GJ 45TCS φ → ¬¬φ, by (MP ) we have ⊢GJ 45TCS ¬¬φ and
⊢GJ 45TCS [r · t] : ¬¬φ, i.e. E0(r · t,¬¬φ) = 1.
Thus, we have |¬¬t : φ→ [r · t] : ¬¬φ|Mx = 1.
This is of course not so surprising as crisp Go¨del-Mkrtychev models correspond to classical Mkrtychev models
in the respective class, and in classical modal logic we have
¬¬θ → ¬¬θ ≡ θ → θ
which is of course classically realizable and this realization is thus valid in all crisp Go¨del-Mkrtychev models.
The condition 6⊢GJ 45TCS ¬¬φ is necessary, at least for axiomatically appropriate constant specifications as if
⊢GJ 45TCS ¬¬φ, then by internalization(Corr. 1, as TCS is axiomatically appropriate), we have ⊢GJ 45TCS s :
¬¬φ for some s ∈ Jt and then by propositional reasoning in GJ 45TCS:
⊢GJ 45TCS ¬¬t : φ→ s : ¬¬φ.
3. Realization fails with factivity
We can also show non-realizability for GT  and GJ T CS as well as GS4 and GLPCS using the same model
construction, however we need another completeness theorem for this.
This is because the factivity condition E(t, φ) ≤ |φ|M for a Go¨del-Mkrtychev model M = 〈E , e〉 fails for Mx:
Per definition Ex(t, φ) > 0 for any t ∈ Jt and any φ ∈ LJ , thus also Ex(t,⊥) > 0 = |⊥|Mx .
We thus resort to an alternative definition of semantical consequence in Go¨del-Mkrtychev models. Mkrtychev,
in his paper [15], called the corresponding classical concept pre-models and our situation is quite similar to the
ones in Kuznets’ works [13, 14] where he resorts to pre-models as well to provide a countermodel construction
in investigations into computational complexity.
3.1. An alternative completeness theorem. For a Go¨del-Mkrtychev model M = 〈E , e〉, we define at first
the alternative evaluation function | · |∗
M
as follows:
• |⊥|∗
M
= 0,
• |p|∗
M
= e(p) for p ∈ V ar,
• |φ→ ψ|∗
M
= |φ|∗
M
⇒ |ψ|∗
M
,
• |φ ∧ ψ|∗
M
= |φ|∗
M
⊙ |ψ|∗
M
,
• |t : φ|∗
M
= E(t, φ) ⊙ |φ|∗
M
.
We write again M |=∗ φ if |φ|∗
M
= 1 and similarly for sets Γ. The corresponding definition of semantical
entailment then follows naturally.
Definition 4. Let C be a class of GM-models and Γ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ . We write Γ |=
∗
C
φ, if for any M ∈ C: M |=∗ Γ
implies M |=∗ φ.
We get the following two lemmas regarding the equivalence of the two semantics for GJ T CS and GLPCS .
The lemmas and proof are fuzzy replicas of the classical cases found in [13, 15].
Lemma 8. For every M ∈ GMT(or GMLP), there is a N ∈ GM(or GM4) such that |φ|M = |φ|
∗
N
for every
φ ∈ LJ .
Proof. Let M = 〈E , e〉 ∈ GMT(or GMLP) and set N = M ∈ GM(or GM4). We show the claim by induction on
LJ . The propositional cases are clear, so let φ ∈ LJ such that |φ|M = |φ|
∗
N
and let t ∈ Jt. We have
|t : φ|∗
N
= E(t, φ)⊙ |φ|∗
N
= E(t, φ)⊙ |φ|M
= E(t, φ)
= |t : φ|M
where the third equality follows from the definition of GMT(or GMLP) which require E(t, φ) ≤ |φ|M. 
Lemma 9. For every N ∈ GM(or GM4), there is a M ∈ GMT(or GMLP) such that |φ|∗
N
= |φ|M for every
φ ∈ LJ .
Proof. Let N = 〈E , e〉 ∈ GM(or GM4) and define M = 〈E ′, e〉 by E ′(t, φ) = E(t, φ) ⊙ |φ|∗
N
. Then, we first show
|φ|∗
N
= |φ|M for every φ ∈ LJ by induction on LJ . Again, the propositional cases are clear. So let φ satisfy the
claim and t ∈ Jt. Then by definition
|t : φ|M = E
′(t, φ) = E(t, φ)⊙ |φ|∗
N
= |t : φ|∗
N
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It remains to show that M ∈ GMT. For this, we first have
E ′(t, φ→ ψ)⊙ E ′(s.φ) = (E(t, φ→ ψ)⊙ |φ→ ψ|∗N)⊙ (E(s, φ) ⊙ |φ|
∗
N)
= (E(t, φ→ ψ)⊙ E(s, φ))⊙ (|φ→ ψ|∗
N
⊙ |φ|∗
N
)
≤ E(t · s, ψ)⊙ |ψ|∗N
= E ′(t · s, ψ)
as well as
E ′(t, φ)⊕ E ′(s, φ) = (E(t, φ) ⊙ |φ|∗N)⊙ (E(s, φ)⊙ |φ|
∗
N)
= (E(t, φ) ⊙ E(s, φ)) ⊙ |φ|∗
N
≤ E(t+ s, φ)⊙ |φ|∗N
= E ′(t+ s, φ).
For the factivity condition, we naturally have
E ′(t, φ) = E(t, φ) ⊙ |φ|∗N ≤ |φ|
∗
N = |φ|M.
were the last equality follows from the before proved adequacy of M for N. If N is a GM4-model, then also
E(t, φ) ≤ E(!t, t : φ) and therefore
E ′(t, φ) = E(t, φ) ⊙ |φ|∗N
≤ E(!t, t : φ)⊙ |t : φ|∗
N
= E ′(!t, t : φ)
where the inequality follows from the fact that E(t, φ)⊙|φ|∗
N
≤ E(!t, t : φ) as well as E(t, φ)⊙|φ|∗
N
= |t : φ|∗
N
. 
Naturally, in the two lemmas above, if one model respects a constant specification, the constructed equivalent
respects it as well.
In the following, let GJL0 = GJ T 0,GLP0 and GMJL = GM,GM4 as well as GMJLT = GMT,GMLP respec-
tively. Also, let CS be a constant specification for GJL0.
Theorem 10. For any Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ LJ : Γ |=
∗
GMJLCS
φ iff Γ ⊢GJLCS φ.
Proof. By the standard completeness theorem, Thm. 2, we show the equivalence of |=GMJLTCS and |=
∗
GMJLCS
.
Suppose Γ |=∗
GMJLCS
φ, i.e. for every M ∈ GMJLCS, if M |=
∗ Γ, then M |=∗ φ. By Lem. 8, for every
N ∈ GMJLTCS, if we have N |= Γ, then N |= φ. Thus, we have Γ |=GMJLTCS φ.
For the reverse, suppose Γ |=GMJLTCS φ, i.e. for every M ∈ GMJLTCS, if M |= Γ, then M |= φ. Again, now by
Lem. 9, for every N ∈ GMJLCS, if we have N |=
∗ Γ, then N |=∗ φ. Thus, we have Γ |=∗
GMJLCS
φ. 
3.2. GJ T CS and GLPCS do not realize GT  and GS4. Here, let TCS be the total constant specification
for GLP0. Again, with x ∈ (0, 1), we define another x-rooted provability model M
′
x = 〈E
′
x, ex〉 with ex as before
and
E ′x(t, φ) =
{
1 if ⊢GLPTCS φ and ⊢GLPTCS t : φ
x else
for any t ∈ Jt, φ ∈ LJ . As before, we get the following lemma, however now for TCS being the total constant
specification for GLP0.
Lemma 11. For any x ∈ (0, 1), M′x is a GM4TCS-model.
As before, but with a slightly changed proof altered for the alternative semantics, we obtain the following
lemma. Here, we have to restrict ourselves to propositional variables in LJ , as in the new semantics it is
relatively hard to control the truth value of compound statements containing justifications.
Lemma 12. For any p ∈ V ar and any t, s ∈ Jt:
6⊢GLPTCS ¬¬t : p→ s : ¬¬p.
Proof. Let p ∈ V ar and t, s ∈ Jt as well as x ∈ (0, 1). Then naturally 6⊢GLPTCS p and 6⊢GLPTCS ¬¬p. Thus,
|t : p|∗
M′
x
= E ′x(t, p)⊙ |p|
∗
M′
x
= E ′x(t, p)⊙ ex(p) = x⊙ x = x ∈ (0, 1).
As x > 0, we have |¬¬t : p|∗
M′
x
= 1 as before. However, we have
|s : ¬¬p|∗
M′
x
= E ′x(s,¬¬p) ⊙ |¬¬p|
∗
M′
x
= E ′x(s,¬¬p)⊙ ∼
2 ex(p) = x⊙ 1 = x < 1
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as 6⊢GJCS ¬¬p and ex(p) = x > 0, i.e. ∼
2 ex(p) = 1. Thus, we have
|¬¬t : p→ s : ¬¬p|∗
M′
x
= x < 1
and as by Lem. 11, M′x is a GM4TCS-model. Per definition, we have
6|=∗GM4TCS ¬¬t : p→ s : ¬¬p,
that is by Thm. 10:
6⊢GLPTCS ¬¬t : p→ s : ¬¬p.

As before, we obtain the following two theorems.
Theorem 13. For any constant specification CS for GJ T 0: (ThGJT CS )
◦ ( ThGT  .
Theorem 14. For any constant specification CS for GLP0: (ThGLPCS )
◦ ( ThGS4 .
As before with GJ 40, also GJ T CS and GLPCS do not even realize GK. But in this case, the forgetful pro-
jection of the factivity axiom scheme t : φ→ φ is not a theorem of GK, i.e. again (ThGJT CS )
◦, (ThGLPCS )
◦ 6⊆
ThGK .
4. Conclusion
We have shown that the four Go¨del justification logics GJ CS, GJ T CS, GJ 4CS, GLPCS from [16] do not
realize the standard Go¨del modal logics GK, GT , GK4 and GS4 from [3, 4] and by this answered one of
the open problems in [8, 16] negatively. The Go¨del justifications logics arise as natural generalizations of the
classical cases, both in model theoretic and proof theoretic terms. Also, they are compliant with the standard
Go¨del modal logics via the forgetful projection. We thus advocate for the conclusion that they are not “the
wrong“ Go¨del justification logics but that there is an effective gap between Go¨del (fuzzy) justification logics and
Go¨del modal logics, inherent to the many-valuedness of the base logic, which is in strong contrast to the classical
counterparts where the realization theorems form one of the core natural components in their relationship, even
being one of the key factors of their origination.
We didn’t consider the Go¨del justification logics GJ 45CS and GJ T 45CS explicitly which contain the negative
introspection axiom ¬t : φ →?t : ¬t : φ. This has multiple reasons. For one, the alternative Go¨del-Mkrtychev
semantics does not extend to the case of GJ T 45CS which also has the factivity axiom t : φ → φ. This is in
strong similarity to classical justification logic, see. e.g. [17]. For another, the development regarding Go¨del
modal logics with negative introspection mostly relies on adding the possibility-modality ♦ (see e.g. [5]) which
is also why there is no explicit statement regarding non-realization with GJ 45CS in section 2. If one would
axiomatically define GK45 (which by now seems to have been unmentioned in the literature) as the extension of
GK4 by the (-only) negative introspection axiom scheme ¬φ→ ¬φ, we would obtain a similar forgetful
projection result as in Thm. 3, and thus would get the theorem
(ThGJ 45CS )
◦ ( ThGK45 .
directly through Lem. 5. It shall be interesting to advance the study of Go¨del modal logics and their realizations
for these cases in the future.
Another interesting direction is to classify the fragments of the standard Go¨del modal logics which are
realized by the basic Go¨del justification logics, if possible. Removing the axiom (Z) should at least provide a
lower bound. Also, if possible, it would be interesting to see if there is a natural semantical characterization of
this fragment which suitably generalizes Go¨del-Kripke models.
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